JUDICIAL REVIEW AND CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM - ANALYSING THE SUPREME COURT’S ROLE IN RESOLVING CENTRE–STATE POWER CONFLICTS IN INDIA

Abstract

India’s constitutional framework establishes a distinctive model of federalism that combines a strong Union with constitutionally guaranteed powers of the States. Unlike classical federations, the Indian Constitution adopts a flexible federal arrangement that enables the Union to exercise wider authority during exceptional circumstances while preserving the autonomy of the States within their constitutionally assigned spheres. The Supreme Court of India occupies a central position within this constitutional design through its power of judicial review, acting as the guardian of the Constitution and the ultimate arbiter of disputes concerning the distribution of powers between the Union and the States. Over the decades, judicial interpretation has significantly influenced the evolution of constitutional federalism by clarifying legislative competence, limiting executive excesses, preserving democratic institutions, and reinforcing the doctrine of the basic structure. This paper critically examines the role of judicial review in resolving Centre–State power conflicts in India by analysing the constitutional framework, landmark judicial decisions, and contemporary federal disputes. It evaluates how the Supreme Court has balanced the competing constitutional objectives of national unity and State autonomy while adapting federal principles to changing political and administrative realities.